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Abstract
Finger vein recognition has emerged as an accurate and
reliable biometric modality that was deployed in various se-
curity applications. However, the use of finger vein recogni-
tion also indicated its vulnerability to presentation attacks
(or direct attacks). In this work, we present a novel algo-
rithm to identify the liveness of the finger vein character-
istic that is presented to the sensor. The core idea of the
proposed approach is to magnify the blood flow through the
finger vein to measure its liveness. To this extent, we employ
the Eulerian Video Magnification (EVM) approach to en-
hancing the motion of the blood in the recorded finger vein
video. Next, we further process the magnified video to ex-
tract the motion-based features using optical flow to identify
the finger vein artefacts. Extensive experiments are carried
out on a relatively large database that is comprised of 300
unique finger vein videos corresponding to 100 subjects.
The finger vein artefact database is captured by printing
the real (or normal) presentation image of the finger vein
on a high-quality paper using two different kinds of printers
namely laser and inkjet. Extensive comparative evaluation
with four different well-established state-of-the-art schemes
demonstrated the efficacy of the proposed scheme.
1. Introduction
Biometric systems are widely used in various applica-
tions that demand reliable user identity authentication based
on either physical and/or behaviour characteristics. Even
though biometric systems are known for their reliable bio-
metric performance, at the same time they have also demon-
strated a vulnerability to various kinds of attacks. The at-
tacks on biometric systems can be broadly classified into
two types namely: (1) Direct Attack (2) Indirect Attack.
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Figure 1: Illustration of finger vein artefact (a) Real Image
(b) Artefact (print)
The direct attack is also called presentation attack and
merely involves in presenting a biometric artefact to the
sensor to gain access. The indirect attack involves in at-
tacking the different working components of the biometric
system and hence demands the need for understanding the
process flow of biometric systems. When comparing these
two kinds of attacks, the direct attack or presentation attack
appears not only feasible but also more cost effective for the
attacker to break a biometric system.
Most of the biometrics modalities have demonstrated the
vulnerability for presentation attacks [2][8]. Among the
various biometric modality, the finger vein biometrics is
gaining more popularity because of its robustness and accu-
racy. Furthermore, the finger vein biometric is considered
as a trustworthy modality since the vein pattern is present
inside the skin and thus no latent prints are left unintention-
ally. Further, the characteristic is not visible to the naked
eyes and hence not easy to capture in a non-intrusive man-
ner unlike other biometric modalities such as the face, iris
or fingerprint. Also, the finger vein biometric is considered
to be more stable since the persons finger vein pattern re-
main relatively stable during his/her lifetime [1] although
no definitive scientific studies exist.
Recently, the vulnerability of finger vein biometric sys-
tems has been investigated in [10] for presentation attacks
using a print artefact. The finger vein print artefacts are
generated by printing the finger vein image using a con-
ventional printer. In the next step, this is further enhanced
in terms of contours using a black ink white board marker.
This artefact is then presented to the finger vein sensor to
capture the artefact samples. Extensive analysis is pre-
sented using a finger vein artefact database comprised of
50 subjects indicated the vulnerability of the finger vein
biometrics with a Spoof False Acceptance Rate (SFAR)
of 86%. More recently, the 1st Competition on Counter
Measures to Finger Vein Spoofing Attacks was organised
in conjunction with the International Conference of Bio-
metrics 2015. Figure 1 illustrates the finger vein artefact
sample from the Spoofing-Attack finger vein database [9]
used in this competition. Early results available from this
competition introduced three different Presentation Attack
Detection (PAD) algorithms using (1) Binarized Statistical
Image Features (BSIF), (2) Riesz transform and (3) Local
Phase Quantization (LPQ) [14] and Weber Local Descrip-
tor (WLD). All these schemes have used Support Vector
Machine (SVM) as a classifier. The best result is noted
for the third scheme based on the combination of Local
Phase Quantization (LPQ) [14] and Weber Local Descrip-
tor (WLD) as a feature extraction and SVM as a classifier.
Since all the available PAD techniques are constructed on a
learning based schemes, they may have difficulties to gen-
eralise. Furthermore, the use of texture based features are
highly sensitive to noise and thus less robust on unseen at-
tacks.
Hence, this paper presents a liveness measure based on
the motion magnification for finger vein PAD. To the best
of our knowledge, there is no similar prior work for use as
a finger vein liveness measure. For this purpose, we devel-
oped a new finger vein video artefact database comprised of
100 subjects whose videos are recorded in two different ses-
sions. We generate two different artefacts by printing a real
finger vein image using inkjet and laser printer. We then
propose a novel scheme based on Eulerian Video Magnifi-
cation (EVM) [11] to magnify the motion of the blood in
the finger vein. We then compute the optical flow between
the first and the last frame in the EVM video to compute
the motion magnitude that in turn is compared against the
pre-set threshold to make the decision on whether the pre-
sented video is an artefact or a normal presentation. Ex-
tensive experiments are presented that include the vulnera-
bility assessment as well as the comparative evaluation of
the proposed liveness measure with four well-established
finger vein PAD algorithms. Experimental results demon-
strated the efficacy of the proposed finger vein PAD algo-
rithm with the lowest ACER of 2.20% on inkjet print arte-
fact and ACER of 3.60% on laser jet print artefact.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2
presents the finger vein artefact data collection, Section 3
presents the proposed scheme, Section 4 presents the exper-
imental results and discussion. Finally, Section 5 draws the
conclusion of this work.
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Figure 2: Example of the finger vein artefact (a) Back view
(b) Side view (c) Top view
2. Finger vein artefact data collection
We collect a new large scale finger vein artefact database
in which artefacts are generated using two different kinds
of printers such as inkjet and laser printer. Our database is
comprised of 100 subjects for which we capture the finger
vein from four different fingers namely right index, right
middle, left index and left the middle. However, some of
the subjects were not able to provide all four fingers due to
the various reasons. Thus, the collected database has 300
unique finger vein samples that correspond to 100 subjects.
All samples are collected in our laboratory using our GUC
finger vein sensor. The finger vein sensor used in this work
will capture the finger vein image by penetrating the near
infrared light through the finger. Thus, the subject will po-
sition the finger inside the sensor, the LED light is illumi-
nating the dorsal part of the finger so that it will penetrate
through the finger and the ventral vein pattern is captured
by the camera located on the opposite side.
2.1. Real sample capture
The real sample database is collected by asking the user
to place the finger on the sensor. We capture the video for
the duration of 1.67 seconds at a rate of 15 frames per sec-
ond that will result in 25 frames for each video capture. The
data capture process is carried out in two different sessions
to have two independent video captures for every subject.
Thus, we have a total of 600 videos with 600 ∗ 25 = 15000
frames corresponding to a real finger vein.
2.2. Finger vein artefact generation
(a) (b)
Figure 3: Illustration of Finger vein presentation attack (a)
working vein sensor with LED glowing (b) Attack on the
sensor with finger vein artefact and external light
In this work, we generated the artefacts by printing the
real sample using different kinds of printers such as inkjet
and laser. The motivation for using the print attack is by
because it is very easy to generate, cost effective and al-
ready proven to be efficient in a previous study [9]. In or-
der to generate the finger vein artefacts using inkjet printer,
we first perform the pre-processing on each of the captured
frame of the video by extracting the Region of Extract (ROI)
and then rescaling the ROI finger vein to have dimension of
100 × 300 pixels. We then carry out the contrast enhance-
ment using histogram equalisation to improve the contrast
of the real image before printing using high-quality glossy
paper with 300 gr. A similar procedure is also followed
to generate the laser print artefact, which also uses high-
quality paper with 200gr on which a real finger vein sample
is printed using a laser printer.
After we generated the artefact, we present it to the fin-
ger vein sensor as presentation attack instrument. Our main
idea is to present this artefact to the sensor such that it will
block the LED illumination and then we use the external
visible light source to illuminate the artefact so that the
attack instrument is successfully captured by the camera.
However, in a real scenario the finger vein sensor uses the
LED illumination to illuminate the finger through sideways
or back penetration for a normal image capture. Thus, we
designed the final artefact to block both sides and any back
illumination. To this extent, we have used a thick plastic
base on which the print finger vein artefact is placed and
presented to the sensor. Figure 2 shows the final artefact
used to attack the GUC finger vein sensor. Figure 3 shows
the presentation attack on the vein sensor using the artefact
showed in the Figure 2.
Figure 4 shows both real (normal) finger vein images and
artefact finger vein images (one frame from the video) cap-
tures using our GUC finger vein sensor. Here one can ob-
serve the good quality of a finger vein artefact image col-
lected by following our outlined procedure.
3. Proposed scheme
Figure 5 shows the block diagram of the proposed fin-
ger vein PAD scheme that can be structured in two main
components namely: The PAD module and the finger
vein verification module. Given the finger vein video
Fv = {Fv1, Fv2, . . . , Fvn}, where n indicates the number
of frames. We then process each frame Fvn to extract the
Region Of Interest (ROI). Since the GUC sensor has dedi-
cated space to place the finger, the ROI extraction is carried
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Figure 4: Comparison between real and artefact capture (a) Real Image (b) Inkjet print artefact (c) Laser print artefact
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Figure 5: Block diagram of the proposed finger vein PAD scheme
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Figure 6: Qualitative illustration of the EVM motion magnification on real, inkjet print and laser print finger vein video
out by setting a pre-assigned rectangular area to cover the
region of interest for the finger. The obtained ROI finger
vein image Frvn is further re-sized to have a dimension of
100× 300 pixels before passing it to the PAD module.
3.1. PAD module
The core idea of the proposed finger vein PAD module is
to explore the motion of blood that flows through the finger
vein Fv . To this extent, we employ the Eulerian Video Mag-
nification (EVM) [11] that can amplify the inherent motion.
The EVM algorithm is based on processing both temporal
and spatial filtered information that can localise and mag-
nify the inherent motion using Taylor expansion assump-
tion. For each ROI frame Frvn, the first step involves in de-
composing the ROI frameFrv1 into spatial Laplacian bands
which are then processed using an ideal temporal bandpass
filter to isolate the desired temporal motion in each band.
Finally, the isolated bandpass signal is then multiplied by
an amplification factor α and added to the original signal.
The motion magnification is depended on both filter and the
value of the magnification factor α. In this work, we choose
the α value as 250 based on the visual inspection of the pro-
cessed finger vein frames from the training set. The value
of α is kept constant throughout our experiment. Thus, the
enhanced motion will provide a significant information on
the liveness of the finger vein by magnifying the motion of
the blood that flow through the finger vein. Let the EVM
processed video corresponding to the input video Fv be de-
noted as FE = {FE1, FE2, . . . , FEn}.
Figure 6 shows the quantitative results of the motion
magnification obtained using EVM algorithm on both real
and artefact finger vein video at four different instances
starting from Frame 1, Frame 9, Frame 18 and Frame 25.
It is quite interesting to observe from Figure 6 that, the use
of EVM on the real finger vein video shows a significant
magnification of the blood flow by emphasizing the finger
vein parts in the frames. Furthermore, the magnification
of the blood flow increases with time as we can observe a
most significant motion enhancement in the Frame 25 when
compared to that of Frame 1. However, it is also interesting
to observe at the same selected frames almost zero motion
magnification in the case of the artefact finger vein videos.
These qualitative results demonstrate the applicability of the
EVM method for the finger vein liveness detection.
(a) (b) (c)
FE1 FE25 OF
Id
en
tit
y 
1
Id
en
tit
y 
2
Figure 7: Qualitative results of motion features on real
finger vein sample illustrated on two different finger vein
videos (a) First frame (b) Last EVM frame (c) Motion com-
puted using optical flow
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Figure 8: Qualitative results of motion features on inkjet
print artefact finger vein sample illustrated on two different
finger vein videos (a) First frame (b) Last EVM frame (c)
Motion computed using optical flow
In the next step, we further process the motion magnifi-
cation finger vein video Fv to classify each presented video
as either real or artefact by extracting the motion-based fea-
tures. We employ optical flow [4] to extract the motion-
based features. The optical flow will compute the motion
of each pixel by solving the optimisation problem. In this
work, the successive over-relaxation (SOR) [4] is used to
solve the optimisation problem due to its low computational
complexity. However, computing the optical flow for every
frame of FE is highly computational. Thus, we propose to
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Figure 9: Qualitative results of motion features on laser
print artefact finger vein sample illustrated on two differ-
ent finger vein videos (a) First frame (b) Last EVM frame
(c) Motion computed using optical flow
compute the optical flow between the first and last frame of
FE . Since the use of EVM requires a first couple of frames
to enhance the motion, the use of the first frame FE1 rep-
resents the normal frame where the last frame FE25 repre-
sents the motion enhanced frame. Thus, it is our assertion
that the optical flow computation between these two frames
will provide a significant information about the motion of
blood that can form the evidence of liveness of a captured
finger vein characteristic. Figure 7 illustrates the qualita-
tive results of the optical flow between FE1 and FE25 on
real finger vein video where Figure 8 and 9 shows the qual-
itative results on inkjet print and laser print artefact finger
vein video. Thus, one can observe the significant change in
the motion magnitude (Figure 7 (c)) of the real presentation
when compared with the artefact presentation (and Figure 8
(c) and 9 (c)). Finally, we obtain the final decision by sim-
ply comparing the motion magnitude to the preset threshold
as follows:
[Mx,My] = OF (FE1, FE25) (1)
Where, OF indicates the optical flow operation on the first
frame FE1 and the last frame FE25, Mx indicates the flow
in horizontal direction andMy indicates the flow in vertical
direction.
MotionMag =
∑
j
∑
k
(√
[(Mx)2 + (My)2]
)
(2)
Where, MotionMag indicates the quantitative value of the
motion magnitude, j indicates the number of rows and k
indicates the number of columns.
De =
{
Real, if, MotionMag ≥ Th,
Attack, otherwise
(3)
Where, De indicates the final decision and Th is the pre-
determined threshold value on the training set.
3.2. Finger vein verification
The finger vein verification system (or baseline system)
employed in this work is based on the Maximum Curvature
Points (MCP) [5] as a feature extraction and correlation as
a comparator. This choice is made by considering the high
performance and fewer computation characteristics exhib-
ited by the MCP features [6].
4. Experiments and Results
This section describes the experimental protocols and the
experimental results obtained by comparing the proposed
scheme with four different state-of-the-art finger vein pre-
sentation attack detection algorithms.
4.1. Evaluation protocols
For the experiments, each finger is considered as a
unique finger instance that will result in 300 unique sam-
ples. For each unique instance, we have collected two
videos in two separate sessions. We then divided the whole
database into two independent subsets namely: training and
testing set. The training set is comprised of first 50 unique
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Figure 10: Score distribution with inkjet print artefact
Scores
-0.1 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
N
or
m
al
iz
ed
 C
ou
nt
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4 Genuine Scores
Imposter Scores
Laserjet print attack Scores
Figure 11: Score distribution with laser print artefact
instances and the testing set is comprised of remaining 250
instances. The training set is used for multiple purpose in
this work that includes (1) To set the threshold value based
on the Equal Error Rate (EER%) for vulnerability analy-
sis (2) Used to set the Threshold value Th (see Equation 3)
with the proposed PAD scheme (3) used as the training set
to evaluate the state-of-the-art finger vein PAD algorithms.
The testing set is solely used to evaluate the performance
of the proposed as well as state-of-the-art finger vein PAD
schemes.
4.2. Results and discussion
We first present the vulnerability study on our GUC fin-
ger vein sensor [7] to 2 different kinds of finger vein print
artefacts. The main goal of this vulnerability study is to
obtain the Spoof False Acceptance Rate (SFAR%) that in-
dicates the applicability of the artefact samples collected in
this work to spoof the sensor. To this extent, we consider
the baseline finger vein recognition system that operates in
two modes namely: normal mode and attack mode to obtain
the comparison scores. In the normal mode, we have used
one frame of a real video from the first session as the refer-
ence and we have used all 25 frames of a real video from the
second session as the probe. This will generate 25× 250 =
6250 genuine scores and 250× 249× 25 = 1556250 zero-
effort impostor scores. For the attack mode, we have used
one frame of a real video (same image that we have used
with normal mode) while the probe sample corresponds to
the finger vein artefact video that is comprised of 25 frames.
Thus, here also we have 25 × 250 = 6250 genuine scores
and 250× 249× 25 = 1556250 impostor scores.
Figure 10 shows the score distribution obtained on both
normal and inkjet print artefact obtained using the base-
line finger vein system. The black vertical line in Figure
10 and 11 indicates the threshold value obtained on the
training dataset that corresponds to the EER value of the
baseline finger vein system operating in the normal mode
(i.e. with real presentation). As observed from the Fig-
ure 10, the inkjet print artefact scores lies between impos-
tor and genuine scores of the real presentation and shows
an SFAR of 90.62%. A similar observation can also be
noted for the laser print finger vein artefact where the cor-
responding score distribution is shown in Figure 11. Here
also it can be observed that spoof scores show significant
overlapping with genuine and imposter scores obtained us-
ing real presentation and thereby indicating an SFAR of
91.87%. The obtained SFAR shows the vulnerability of the
finger vein sensor to the artefacts generated in this work and
thereby motivates the need for presentation attack detection
(or countermeasure) techniques to mitigate these attacks.
In the following, we present and discuss the results
obtained on the proposed PAD scheme on the finger vein
verification system. The quantitative performance of the
presentation attack detection algorithms are presented
according to the ISO/IEC WD 30107-3 [3] in terms of: (1)
Attack Presentation Classification Error Rate (APCER),
which is defined as a proportion of attack presentation
incorrectly classified as normal (or real) presentation (2)
Normal Presentation Classification Error Rate (NPCER)
which is defined as proportion of normal presentation
incorrectly classified as attack presentation. Finally, the
performance of the overall PAD algorithm is presented in
terms of Average Classification Error Rate (ACER) such
that,
ACER =
(APCER+NPCER)
2
(4)
The lower the values of ACER, the better is the PAD per-
formance.
Table 1: Performance of the proposed scheme on inkjet
print artefact. (∗ reimplemented in Matlab)
Method APCER (%) NPCER (%) ACER (%)
Riesz transform-SVM∗ [9] 9.20 84.40 46.8
LPQ+WLD-SVM ∗ [9] 22.80 0.40 11.6
LBP-SVM ∗ [9] 34.40 2.40 18.40
M-BSIF-SVM ∗ [9] 20.00 5.60 12.80
Proposed scheme 2.40 2.00 2.20
Table 1 and 2 indicates the quantitative performance of
the proposed method when compared to 4 different state-
of-the-art schemes that was employed in 1st Competition
on Counter Measures to Finger Vein Spoofing Attacks [9].
Since the state-of-the-art schemes are based on frame based
feature extraction and learning, we have used the training
set (see Section 4.1) that comprised of first 50 unique in-
stances with video frames to train the SVM classifier. A
final decision is obtained for the probe video by using ma-
jority voting that is, if the majority of the frames in the probe
video is classified as a real then the probe video is consid-
ered as real - otherwise as an attack. However, the proposed
scheme does not use any classifier based on learning, but it
still requires to compute the value of a threshold Th (see
Equation 3). We computed the threshold value using the
training set incorporating real (or normal) finger vein video
frames and kept constant on both types of artefacts used in
this work. This further justifies the generalisation capability
of the proposed scheme. Based on the quantitative results
obtained on the inkjet print artefact as tabulated in Table 1,
the proposed scheme outperforms the existing state-of-the-
art schemes with the best ACER of 2.20%.
Table 2 shows the results obtained on the laser print fin-
ger vein artefact. Here also it can be observed that the
proposed scheme outperforms the existing state-of-the-art
schemes with the best ACER of 3.60%. Thus, based on
Table 2: Performance of the proposed scheme on laserjet
print artefact. (∗ reimplemented in Matlab)
Method APCER(%) NPCER (%) ACER (%)
Riesz transform-SVM ∗ [9] 7.20 79.60 43.40
LPQ+WLD-SVM ∗ [9] 13.20 1.60 7.40
LBP-SVM ∗ [9] 10.00 6.00 8.00
M-BSIF-SVM ∗ [9] 8.00 14.00 11.00
Proposed scheme 5.20 2.00 3.60
the above experiments it can be observed that the proposed
scheme based motion magnification using EVM emerged
as the best finger vein presentation attack detection algo-
rithm. Kindly refer to http://youtu.be/aXEoS7u63XY for
more comprehensive results.
5. Conclusion
A presentation attack detection algorithm in finger vein
recognition must produce both a reliable and a robust solu-
tion to improve the practicality for finger vein biometrics.
In this research, we present a novel solution to identify an
attack on finger vein recognition based on magnifying the
blood motion in the finger vein. The proposed method is
tailored using Eulerian Video Magnification (EVM) to mag-
nify the motion and optical flow to compute the motion fea-
tures. We then used a simple classification scheme by com-
paring the motion magnitude obtained using optical flow to
the pre-set value of the threshold Th. The pre-set threshold
value is computed on the training set and kept constant on
the testing set. Since the proposed method is based on the
liveness measure by checking the blood flow, it can be gen-
eralised for any unseen attack. Extensive experiments are
carried out on two different kinds of finger vein artefacts
generated by printing a real finger vein images using laser
and inkjet printer. A comparative evaluation is presented by
evaluating the performance of the proposed scheme along
with four different state-of-the-art schemes. The experi-
mental results demonstrate the best performance of the pro-
posed framework with the lowest ACER of ACER of 2.20%
on inkjet print artefact and ACER of 3.60% on laser jet print
artefact.
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